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Abstract
Collaborative business process management allows for the automated coordination of processes involving human and com-
puter actors. In modern economies, it is increasingly needed for this coordination to be not only within organizations but also
to cross organizational boundaries. The dependence on the performance of other organizations should, however, be limited,
and the control over the own processes is required from a competitiveness perspective. The main objective of this work is to
propose an evaluation model for measuring a resilience of a service-oriented architecture (SOA) collaborative process man-
agement system. In this paper, we have proposed resilience analysis perspectives of SOA collaborative process systems, i.e.,
overall system perspective, individual process model perspective, individual process instance perspective, service perspective,
and resource perspective. A collaborative incident and maintenance notification process system is reviewed for illustrating
our resilience analysis. This research contributes to extend SOA collaborative business process management systems with
resilience support, not only looking at quantification and identification of resilience factors, but also considering ways of
improving the resilience of SOA collaborative process systems through measures at design and runtime.
Keywords Collaborative business processes management · Resilience · Resilience of SOA collaborative process systems ·
Service-oriented systems · Cloud-based SOA collaborative business process management
1 Introduction
Collaborative business processes are increasingly driven by
business flexibility and agility. The increasing importance
of value chains and production networks, of interconnected
organizations, collaboration dynamics, outsourcing, and the
increasing potential of new ICT technologies supported inno-
vations have driven research into such collaborative networks
[33]. Collaborative networks [6,12] and collaborative busi-
ness process management [27,33] have been fostered by
globalization over decades.
Advances in ICT, Internet, and cloud computing have
led to the explosion of collaborative networks both at orga-
nizational and individual contributor levels. A pervasive




1 Faculty of Science and Technology, Bournemouth University,
Talbot Campus, Fern Barrow, Poole, Dorset BH12 5BB, UK
interconnection of, and collaboration among, physical and
virtual objects provides opportunities for the realization of
manufacturing 2.0 (industry 4.0) and sustainable develop-
ment, but only as long as this does not undermine flexibility
and resilience.
Collaborative networks as a relatively new scientific dis-
cipline [6] have been applied to application areas such
as Factories of the Future [13] as well as manufactur-
ing and logistics networks [3]. Organizations, enterprises,
and communities are interconnected by networks in the
new application areas. To support such collaboration in a
hyper-connected world, existing technologies need to be
improved and adapted in terms of larger-scale integration
and more intelligent devices, sensors and cyber-physical
systems involvement. The current business environment is
challenging. As a result, systems need to support enterprise
agility and be resilient in turbulent business environments
[5].
The concept of resilience has gained importance for engi-
neered systems as a way to address their complexity [22].
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The systems are not only designed to be more reliable, but
are also required to be more resilient to withstand unantici-
pated failures without catastrophic losses [14,28]. Different
disciplines have different definitions of resilience. In mate-
rials science, resilience represents the ability of a material to
recover its original shape following a deformation [7]. In the
corporate world, resilience refers to the ability of a company
to bounce back from, or even resist, a large disruption—this
includes, for instance the speed with which it returns to nor-
mal performance level (production, services, fill rate, etc.)
[8]. Within cloud computing, the characteristic of resiliency
can refer to redundant IT resources within the same cloud
(but in different physical locations) or across multiple clouds
[29].
The use of different definitions of resilience in differ-
ent fields leads to different method for measuring system
resilience. Independent of this, in a traditional approach to
process management, the process management system forms
a single point of failure.
As, in general, collaborative process systems are criti-
cal for businesses, the lack of a systematic way to analyze
the resilience of SOA collaborative process systems moti-
vates our research. The research questions thus are to discuss
an appropriate definition of resilience of SOA collaborative
process management systems, as well as how to analyze,
measure and improve the resilience of these systems.
In the context of SOA collaborative process management
systems, resilience is defined as the degree as to which the
system can continue to meet its stakeholders’ expectations
(or the goals of the system) in the presence of errors. Based
upon an analysis of different perspectives of SOA collabo-
rative process management systems, we have analyzed how
the system resilience can be improved in SOA collaborative
process management system from different perspectives.
In this research, we are especially considering how to man-
age inter-enterprise collaboration, i.e., collaborative business
processes that are executed among enterprises and which
cross the organizational boundaries. Within these collabora-
tions, we not only look at the quantification and identification
of resilience factors, but also consider ways of improv-
ing the resilience of SOA collaborative process systems
through measures at design and runtime. Within this con-
text, we consider that (web) services and human interactions
are coordinated through an automated process management
system to form an SOA collaborative process management
system.
Our interpretation of an SOA collaborative process system
is one where starting from a single-organization perspective
a process management system is used to coordinate activi-
ties that are normally executed as services implemented by
multiple constituent systems (whether a service interface to
a classical system or a microservice). This approach is then
expanded through.
In this paper, we focus on SOA collaborative business
process systems as well as analysis of resilience related the
different perspectives of SOA collaborative business process
systems. This work is structured such that after introduc-
ing service-oriented collaborative process management in
Sect. 2, Sect. 3 discusses the various applicable failure modes
and analysis dimensions. Section 4 applies this to present
an analysis of the different perspectives of SOACBPMS
resilience. The resulting framework is then, in Sect. 5, applied
to an incident notification case. Section 6 presents additional
related work, leading to a conclusion in Sect. 7.
2 SOA collaborative process management
Collaborative business processes exist not only in a sin-
gle company between different departments or divisions,
but also among different organizations. Niehaves et al. [33]
highlight that most collaborative business processes can be
found from global value chains [16,39], production networks
[40], interconnected firms [25], collaboration dynamics [2],
outsourcing [20], etc. All mentioned examples involve busi-
ness processes that have been created cross-organizationally.
Research fields such as business process management,
workflow systems, and computerized information systems
consider design, deployment and implementation-related
information systems to support above-mentioned applica-
tions, but do not focus on application in a collaborative
context.
In a collaborative context, contract- or agreement-based
collaboration approaches have been broadly used to sup-
port virtual enterprises [17,49], supply chains [31], inter-
organizations [34], and e-commerce [23,24,50]. Collabora-
tive processes can be also supported by service orchestration
and choreography [26,47] among different organizations.
The SOA collaborative structure could be a peer-to-peer
structure, a centralized structure, or a federated structure.
In a peer-to-peer structure, the collaborative business pro-
cess is implicitly defined by the process instances that drive
sequencing within the partner’s processes and by the inter-
action between the public operations of processes on all
partners’ sides [26]. The collaborative business process mod-
els specify the necessary synchronization among services
which are involved in collaborations among partners.
In contrast, a centralized collaborative structure normally
specifies the interactions among involved partners in an over-
all collaborative process model. The centralized structure is
typically supported by pre-agreed interactions, i.e., a col-
laborative contract, a collaborative agreement. The overall
process is decomposed into activities that are performed
by individual partners, either implemented by an automated
system (web service) or as a task for a human to perform
(intermediated through some task management system). The
123
Service Oriented Computing and Applications (2018) 12:25–39 27
performance of actions can also be implemented as a sub-
process, possibly one that remains within the confines of a
single partner. These subprocesses can be explicitly incor-
porated in the overall process system or completely hidden
as implementation detail invisible from the other partners
(or their systems). Note that this does not consider tangen-
tial processes triggered by action execution, for example a
commitment to deliver a good triggering an order process
due to stock levels dropping below the threshold. When sub-
processes are present, but not managed/coordinated by the
central process management system this may be a case of a
federated process.
Considering federated processes, they are distinguished
from centralized process management in that process-aware
collaboration occurs, but is controlled by multiple auton-
omous management entities. While federated process exe-
cution is normal when processes are managed and executed
by humans (each person manages his own actions within the
agreed boundaries), such coordination is not the norm for
automated process management.
Federated process management can perhaps be best
defined through counter cases. First, a single process manage-
ment system that does not touch other process management
systems (in any way at all) is not federated. Perhaps more
interesting is the contrast with the scenario where two orga-
nizations (A and B) have their own process management
system, and the execution of a process by organization A
happens to involve a process (or multiple) in organization B,
all without awareness. From the perspective of organization
A, the process merely consumes a service provided by B. The
processes (in A and B) may very well be mostly unrelated
or tangential (the service consumption may trigger a CRM
update in B’s CRM). Federated process management in con-
trast implies that the process management systems have some
sort of coordination and awareness. The form this takes can
differ according to the process and business context.
As such, federated process management requires some
degree of meta-level coordination between the process man-
agement systems that perform the service choreographies.
Considering multiple copies of the same process (descrip-
tion) to be the same process (model), multiple instances of
a single process model can, from a technical perspective,
be instantiated on/coordinated by different management sys-
tems. For overall management it is, however, worthwhile
that meta information is coordinated to allow for overall
process-related statistics and information to be collected.
Each process instance should have a single, eventually con-
sistent, state.
When parts of a process are coordinated by different pro-
cess management systems in a federation, there are different
ways this can be organized. In this paper, we only consider
those approaches where at any point of time there is a single
“master” or “owner” of the process instance. The coordina-
tion of a subset of the activities can, however, be delegated
to a different management engine. Ownership may also be
transferred (voluntarily or in response to failure).
Processes that involve multiple parties may be collabora-
tive. While it is possible for this to be limited to two parties,
generally one would expect more than two parties. Various
degrees of collaborativeness can be distinguished. At the low-
est level of collaborativeness, collaborative processes have
little differences to distinguish them from simple provision
of (web) services. At the highest end, there are complex inter-
actions between the involved parties.
In addition to degrees of collaborativeness, there is the
dimension of balance of power or control. Collaborations
with dominant partners, as for example occur in supplier
networks for large manufacturers of cars or airplanes, are
quite different from more peer-to-peer-oriented collabora-
tions where no partner is dominant.
In terms of process management, it is convenient to make
the distinction between service provision or consumption on
the one hand and collaboration on the other hand. Starting
from the precept that all processes have a single initiator, a
process can be seen as collaborative if, at operational level
(not purely on an intellectual basis with human owners), the
initiator and executor have some awareness of each other’s
process and use this in some aspects of operations. The extend
of this awareness (or use) of the other processes can be lim-
ited, for example to monitoring, but there should be some
concrete use of the fact that the collaborator process exists.
While processes can and do exist independently of sup-
porting (software) systems, this paper focuses on automated
processes that are managed through some form of workflow
or business process management system. In this digital rep-
resentation, a process is represented as control flow as well
as activities whose interaction is managed in line with the
control flow to provide the process outcomes. Automation
here implies that the process coordination is automated, not
that all activities within them are automated. In some ways,
human agents still have important roles to play in enactment
and decision making.
In traditional centralized process management systems
process, choreography is seen as performed by a single pro-
cess management system (or process engine). This system
has a full view of the process and all components. In case
that external components are involved, they are treated opa-
quely as service consumption where the system itself has no
further knowledge of the underlying processes or possible
interactions. Of course it is, however, still possible to control
interactions between multiple external services even with the
same (external) owner.
In such a scenario, collaborative process management
would imply that the management system requires quite some
insight into, and control over the implementation of activities
within the collaborating organizations. While cloud com-
123
28 Service Oriented Computing and Applications (2018) 12:25–39
puting makes this insight somewhat easier the main issue
remains that of confidentiality and control. As such, many
collaborators may object to this. In most cases, tight con-
tractual arrangements are needed to allow this collaboration
to happen [27,33], and this is mainly seen in a context with
dominant players.
3 Failure modes of collaborative process
systems
The various process system aspects can fail in various ways,
but they share many aspects of the ways in which they can fail
[35]. For the purpose of limiting the scope of the work, and
avoiding the circular reasoning of making a robust system
robust against errors in its own design or implementation,
we look at failure sources that are out of direct control of the
process system designer. The implementation (in contrast
to the design) of a robust process management system is
out of scope. Instead the focus is on managing causes of
failure external to the system implementation in areas such
as the behavior by external parties, equipment failure and
other external incidents (e.g., fires, power failures).
In addition, we are also looking at failure from a soft-
ware perspective, where manufacturing failure modes inform
the perspective taken, but are not sufficient to analyze inter-
actions across levels of resilience or the kinds of systems.
Overall we distinguish the following orthogonal dimensions
(please note that these are not exclusive):
– Failure temporality Along the time dimension, a failure
can be temporary (an independent temporary event, for
example a network failure due to a power cut); failures
can be intermittent based on a systematic issue (related
failures for example due to insufficient capacity during
nightly batch operations); failures can also be permanent
(the company providing the service has seized operation).
– Failure detectability Some failures are easy to recog-
nize such as those where error messages are provided,
signaled failure. Other failures are detectable based on
business rules or SLA’s such as failure to respond within
a certain time period, detectable failure. The final cate-
gory of failure detection is silent failures either in silent
non-performance (i.e., the request is accepted but never
actioned), silent partial-performance (i.e., some aspects
of the request are not performed, but those aspects per-
formed are valid). The final form of silent failure is silent
corruption where the system provides incorrect state or
results without signaling any error.
– Failure completeness Failure completeness concerns the
degree to which the system is failing. Full failure is a
possibility, but partial failure can occur in various forms
such as degraded performance (e.g., not meeting time
Fig. 1 Process resilience structure
expectations), reduced quality (the results are valid but
not of the quality or precision normally provided, the
range of the function is reduced) or reduced provision
(the domain or image of the functionality is reduced, i.e.,
not all inputs are supported, for example a weather service
would have reduced provision for an area if the weather
station in that area was unavailable for some reason).
– Failure origin The origin of a failure can either be internal
as in it is caused by issues within the logic control of a
system, or externall where the failure is outside of the
control of the system. An internal failure could be a bug
in a service implementation or process description. A
bug in the process management system would be external
from the perspective of a process. A network failure that
causes a service to be unavailable would be external to
that service. Both examples can, in circumstances, be
seen as internal to the overall system. An internal failure
can either be a delegate failure (a used component causes
the problem) or a direct failure where the problem is not
fundamentally in the delegate (although a delegate may
return unexpected (but not invalid) results that trigger the
issue).
Resilience is a measure of a system’s ability to bounce back
from a failure to continue to offer some level of perfor-
mance. Understanding related failure models of collaborative
process systems helps to decompose the measurement of
resilience of the system. Overall this leads to a structure as
depicted in Fig. 1, including analysis of the resilience on
those dimensions in the relevant parts of Sect. 4.
4 Resilience of SOA collaborative process
systems
Resilience and failure are closely related concepts. The over-
all description of a resilience model of an SOA collaborative
process system is a combination of different resilience factors
of different aspects of the system.
123
Service Oriented Computing and Applications (2018) 12:25–39 29
Francis and Bekera [15] have proposed a resilience anal-
ysis framework and a metric for measuring the resilience
of an electric power network. This section discusses how,
based on resilience factors, this framework can be extended
to SOA collaborative business process systems. The different
resilience factors are defined based on different perspectives
of the system layers. As such, the proposed resilience model
is based upon the combination of the analysis of the different
constituent components of the SOA collaborative business
process system.
In the context of this work, resilience can be defined as
a combination of two aspects. The first aspect is the abil-
ity of the system to contain and minimize the effect of any
disruption. The second aspect is the recovery profile of the
system; how does the system reduce the impact of distur-
bances over time including the use of temporary fallbacks
(e.g., using a backup server) until the resumption of normal
operations (e.g., primary and backup systems are functioning
as expected). In this context, a disruption is an event, such
as a fire that leads to failures of the processes coordinated by
the process management system. Another way of looking at
this perspective of resilience is as the impact of a disruption
(or failure) over time.
4.1 Resilience from an overall system perspective
As a consequence of looking at resilience as impact over
time (modeling the impact as an abstract system performance
level), it is possible to conceptualize an impact graph with
performance on one axis and time on the other (see Fig. 2).
On the temporal axis, various recovery stages can be dis-
tinguished as well as an overall time to recovery. As such,
we define Fo the original stable system performance level,
Fd the performance level immediately post-disruption once
equilibrium state has been achieved; Fr ∗ be the performance
level after an initial post-disruption equilibrium state has
been achieved; and Fr be the performance at a new stable
level after recovery efforts have been exhausted. tδ represent
the duration of disruption.
Fig. 2 System performance after initial disruption. Adopted from [15]
To model this, we define Sp to be the speed recovery factor.
Under the disruption event i , a resilience factor ρi :







(tδ/tr ∗)exp[− a(tr − tr ∗)] for tr ≥ tr ∗
tδ/tr ∗ otherwise
td = start of the disruption.
t ′d = equilibrium point at which the disruption causes no fur-
ther performance degradation.
tδ = slack time, i.e., maximum amount of time to post-
disruption equilibrium that is acceptable before ensur-
ing recovery.
tr = time to final recovery, i.e., new equilibrium state.
tr ∗ = time to complete initial recovery actions.
a = parameter controlling decay in resilience attributable to
time to new equilibrium.
Normally, when an interruption occurs, some initial
actions are taken to stabilize the system at some interme-
diate stage after a disruption. Time to recovery, on other
hand, is the length of time post-disruption until a system
is brought back to reliable and sustainable performance in
the long term. The resilience factor explicitly incorporates
the time to recovery by comparing the time required for ini-
tial actions to be completed to a slack time for post-event
recovery, while incorporating a decay factor to account for
increases in the time it takes to reach the final post-disruption
state. Figure 2 illustrates related concepts.
If the initial recovery takes longer than the slack time
(tr ∗ > tδ—illustrated by the cross in Fig. 2) then the
resilience metric decreases (i.e., 1 > tδ/tr ∗). If the initial
recovery is quite efficient (tδ > tr ∗—the position on the hor-
izontal axis marked by a circle), but the system takes a long
time to recover after initial stabilization actions, the resilience
metric also decreases.
Additionally, the hardness of the system in terms of the
proportion of original system functionality (performance)
retained immediately post-disruption is Fd/Fo. The propor-
tion of original system performance retained after the new
stable performance level has been achieved, as Fr /Fo. Notice
that if Fr > Fo, it means that the system performance could
be improved after the disruption. In general, the more func-
tionality is retained relative to original capacity, both after an
initial post-disruption and after a final recovery, the higher
the resilience.
To better understand these ratios, consider a case where
invoked services are performing poorly due to the accessibil-
ity or degraded QoS of network at certain areas. Fd/Fo shows
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to the proportion of normal service level maintained despite
the disruption. Suppose that the network or service provider
has a temporary solution to the service of networks or ser-
vices in some areas and, in the meantime, new version of
services or/and recover efforts aimed at restoring everything
to bring a new initial performance level Fr ∗. Depending on
the damage level, the recovery process may take up to more
effort. Eventually, the collaborative system may be able to
restore most of its services thereby achieving a new equi-
librium. Hence, Fr > Fo would mean the proportion of the
normal system performance retained at the new equilibrium.
Let μ is defined as the probability of system failure. Let
f (·) be the probability density function for system failure.
Suppose further that system failure is a function of a parame-
ter vector z. The possibility of the system failure under event
i is
f (μ|z)
The combination of the possibility of the system failure and
resilience factor is as follows:
f (μ|z)|td ,K
The possibility of occurrence of the event Di in the system
level, a derivation of a measure of expected system function-




Pr [Di ] · f (μ|z) · ρi (Sp, Fr , Fd , Fo)
4.2 Resilience of individual process model
perspective
In general, effective business processes must be able to
accommodate changes in the environment [41]. Within
imperative process modeling, parallelism contained at design
time includes the actual ordering of activities open and thus
provides more flexibility than sequential routing [43]. Some
process models support ‘deferred choices’ which leave the
resolution of a choice to the environment at runtime [43],
YAWL [42] employs a worklets approach [1] to allow for late
modeling. The late modeling allow a new process fragment
to be constructed from scratch or composed from exist-
ing process fragments in order to complete a node which
is marked as underspecified. The resilience of an individ-
ual process also depends on whether there is case handling
and exception handling parts for the process model. Declar-
ative process modeling is easier to defer choices to runtime
[30,45].
If the individual processes consider and handle all error
conditions (events, cases, exceptions, etc.), the resilience fac-
tor related to the individual process is defined as ρi = 1 under
the condition/case/exception i . If the individual processes
are designed with insufficient consideration of flexibility, the
resilience factors related to the individual process will be
ρi = 0 under the condition/case/exception i . A resilience
factor ρi for an individual process is defined as:
ρi =
{
1 specified to handle conditions, cases, exceptions
0 otherwise
If a process model is widely used in the system, the design
of process models could impact the system resilience. The
more flexible process models designed at the design time, the
stronger the resilience of the system could be.
4.3 Resilience of individual process instances
perspective
Some business process management systems [37,44] allow
process instances to deviate at runtime from the execution
path prescribed by the original process without altering the
process definition itself [38,41,46]. The deviation can only
complete changes to the execution sequence for a specific
process instance and does not need to modify original process
models.
Another example of change at the process instance level
is a momentary change [36,41], which is a change affecting
the execution of one or more selected process instances only.
An example of a momentary change is the postponement of
registering a patient that has arrived to the hospital emergency
center: treatment is started immediately. Such a momentary
change performed on a given process instance does not affect
any future instances.
In short, the above-described cases or events are able to be
handled by the related systems with specific business process
modeling languages, the resilience factor of the individual
process instance ρi = 1.
However, not all process instance failures are can be
prevented in above-mentioned systems. There are different
failure modes related to process instance failures, i.e., tem-
poral failures, detectable failures, partial failures that cannot
be handled at process model and instance level. There are
also combinations of different failures for which specifying
solutions are likely infeasible.
From the temporal perspective, some process instances
are, due to their inherent long-running nature, reasonably
resilient to non-permanent failures. The lower the pressure
on time, the stronger the resilience could be.
Detectability is another perspective of analyzing the
resilience of an SOA collaborative process systems. Silent
non-performance and some silent partial-performance pro-
cess instances can possibly be handled through monitoring
and timeouts, which reflect to time [td , td ′] in Fig. 2.
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At process instance level, factors (e.g., events, condi-
tions) whose handling was not specified in the process model
could impact any number of process instances. The total
count impacted process instances need to be analyzed under
the occurrences of unspecific events. The impact process
instances could be based on a same process model and could
also be based on related process models. Measuring the
impact of correlative process instances based on different
process models is needed to reflect real-world process enact-
ment, but comes with additional challenges.
To increase resilience of the system, possibility of the indi-
vidual unspecified factors of the process models needs to be
analyzed and collected. Whether the handling of the unspec-
ified factors should be specified in the process models or
should be left to the process execution engine influences the
improvement in the system resilience, in particular due to the
differing amount of effort involved. Designing preventive or
proactive process models and runtime case handle mecha-
nism is crucial for the system resilience improvement.
4.4 Resilience from a service perspective
Services form the building blocks of a SOA-based process
system. From the service perspective of this system, the exter-
nal services are provided by external systems and cannot be
directly managed. The causes of their failures are therefore
out of scope of this paper, but they may exhibit all forms of
failure modes, i.e., temporal failures, silent non-performance
or partial-performance failures. These constituent service
failures do impact the overarching resilience levels of the
system. Overall, the system is more resilient when it is
easy to (automatically) replace different similar servers from
the same providers or different services from the different
providers for the process (activity execution or process man-
agement).
To increase resilience of the process instances, it is impor-
tant to identify the specific services which are commonly
involved and conditions of service replacement for these
services. Although, even when services cannot be readily
replaced, service failure won’t always lead to instance fail-
ure, it is still important to know the following:
– given the 100% failure of a specific service to further
identify what percentage of the process instances will
fail;
– given the 100% failure of a specific service, what per-
centage of all instances will fail.
– the maximum percentage of impacted instances—all
instances that may fail due to service failure, however,
unlikely
– the minimum percentage of instances—all instances that
will certainly fail due to service failure
These specific high impact services should be identified. To
improve overall system resilience, it is important to have
an automatic mechanism of replacing the services with the
services from the same providers (in different locations) or
different services from the different providers for the process
(activity execution or process management).
4.5 Resilience from a resource perspective
Elastic service provision [21] in a cloud-based environment
is a novel approach executing processes using the resource
elasticity of cloud-based systems. In such a cloud-based
environment, elastic services can be hosted whose resources
may dynamically grow and shrink to meet the requirements
of dynamically varying numbers of users and patterns of
requests.
The execution of individual process instances is performed
by a resource, whether it is a server, a single human (through
a worklist manager) or a pool of resources. The resilience of
the collaborative system increases by elastically accessing to
a pool of resources, e.g., computing power with auto-scaling,
services with auto-replacement, extra human resources.
5 Measuring resilience: a collaborative
notification case
5.1 Collaborative incident andmaintenance
notification case
The Spanish electricity system is generally formed of a
high-voltage electric power transmission network and grid
connecting power stations and substations to transport elec-
tricity from where it is generated to where it is needed.
There are a number of stakeholders in the Spanish elec-
tricity system, each fulfilling various roles in the overall
process of electricity generation and delivery. Many of the
well-established, former government, parties play many of
the roles in the system. The unavoidably monopolistic and
critical roles of market operator (OMEL) and system opera-
tor (REE) remain in government hands. There are three main
energy producers, one market operator, three main distribu-
tors, eighteen substations, and 32 marketers.
The process of delivering electricity to a single customer
involves the entire chain of roles (and therefore actors).
The delivery of electricity to a single geographic group
(for example, a street) of customers likely involves many
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more marketers. Given that most distributors are also active
as marketers on a national level, these distributors gener-
ally act both as each other’s collaborators/customers and
competitors.
Incidents in the electricity system can occur anywhere and
anytime. These incidents, ranging from signal errors, cabling
problems to serious substation overloads, will affect energy
supply, lead to power cuts or even generate a further huge
impact to the community and economy. Maintenance activ-
ities are regularly taking places in different organizations
within the electricity system. These maintenance activities
increase the risk of failures and may trigger trigger interrup-
tions within the electricity systems.
Large commercial customers directly connected to the
132 kV network are generally on interruptible contracts. As
their electricity demands can have significant impact on the
network there is frequent and well-established contact with
these customers that could be used for incident notification.
Residential customers and smaller business users, however,
are often only known by name to marketers. The distribu-
tors and market operator generally only have knowledge of
the addresses affected by a power cut, but no further con-
tact details. As a result, residential and small business users
are currently not notified of incidents directly (for larger dis-
ruptions they may be informed indirectly through the local
press).
To improve customer satisfaction, it becomes clear that
effective incident management includes effective and timely
informing of all customers without relying on suddenly over-
loaded call centers. The information provided should not
only acknowledge the existence of an issue but also provide
information on progress and estimated resolution timelines.
Appropriate, follow-up notifications should be sent to all or
interested customers.
5.2 Cloud-based SOA collaborative process solution
We propose a cloud-based SOA collaborative process solu-
tions for incident and maintenance notification for the
Spanish electricity system [48,51] as an illustrative case
for determining resilience. The incident notification process
used as our case is based upon the use of business process-
oriented mashup engines. These business process-oriented
mashup engines are deployed for all distributors and mar-
keters. This insures that all involved stakeholders can flexibly
deal with appeared incidents (the engines can also be used
for other situational applications).
The architecture of the cloud-based incident and mainte-
nance notification process solution (CIMNPS) has a number
of subsystems. The user management subsystem provides
access control for all stakeholders. The process manage-
ment subsystem handles process uploading, process editing,
process ranking and selection, as well as service discov-
ery. The service runtime management subsystems handle
monitoring, reporting and service invocation at the run-
time. Furthermore the CIMNPS also has two repositories
for collaborative processes and services related to incident
notification.
Business process-oriented mashup engines are deployed
for all stakeholders. The business process model repository
contains collaborative business process models. This repos-
itory is managed by the overall system owner OMEL and
enables sharing and reusing of existing collaborative process
models. The business process editor allows modifying, ver-
ifying, and ranking process models. Each stakeholder has
access to the process editor and is able to make changes to its
processes as long as that does not compromise the integrity
of the overall system. The collaborative process models can
be downloaded or uploaded to the business process model
repository as desired. Process models are instantiated into
process instances after all data sources and invoked services
are (semi-) automatically identified. Figure 3 presents a col-
laborative notification process model, which could help to
understand overall functions of the CIMNPS.
The decentralized execution of process instances is a core
aspect of the incident notification system in the Spanish elec-
tricity system case. While the information needed from both
distributors and marketers is not large in terms of data size
(so transfer would not be a technical challenge), there are
data sensitivity issues. While the information from the dis-
tributors is not commercially sensitive, the data from the
marketers is. For the purpose of incident notification, mar-
keters could download a common process model from the
process model repository on the cloud. Starting with the
downloaded process model, the marketers can make modifi-
cations; for example to adopt different notification channels,
such as sending Facebook messages as well as SMS mes-
sages. The marketers can use a local process editor to allocate
the data (affected customers’ mobile phone number, Face-
book ID, or Twitter ID) and run the business process on a
private process-oriented mashup engine. For the distributors,
incidents or interruptions can be caused or observed in dif-
ferent parts of the organization. Therefore, a sample process
model can be modified according to the situation. The pro-
cess can keep monitoring the process of the repair and ensure
information is consistently published on the web using the
private process engine.
The solution owner (in this case OMEL) mainly concen-
trates on maintaining the process model repository and on
providing some common web services. OMEL also provides
a process editor and a process engine for users testing the pro-
cess model. The other users are certainly able to upload their
data for running their processes in case the private process
engine is out of order. A collaborative process which runs in
the cloud can be supported for special cases, e.g., monitoring
the collaborative process.
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Fig. 3 Cloud-based incident and maintenance notification process model
5.3 Resilience analysis of CIMNPS
In Sect. 5.1, we presented the case of the Spanish electricity
system. The major stakeholders are summarized in Table 1.
In regards to these stakeholders, there are four major inci-
dent categories, i.e., incidents related to main grid, incidents
related to main distributors, incidents related to main energy
producers, and incidents related to substations. The inci-
dents could also be combinations of the above-mentioned
categories. The major maintenance categories are double of
the incident categories (i.e., eight major maintenance cate-
gories), which one kind of maintenance could be internal or
external. Therefore, there are at least 12 collaborative process
models for supporting the incident and maintenance notifi-
cation in the CIMNPS. Figure 3 presents only one high-level
collaborative notification process model in CIMNPS.
Furthermore, there are also local process models, which
exist within one stakeholder organization for notification
purposes. There are thus possible 56 local process model
variables. The total kinds of notifications could be incident
notifications, different maintenance notifications; mainte-
nance caused an incident notification and further combines
internal and/or external notifications.
Table 1 Main stakeholders in
the Spanish electricity system
Main stakeholders Number




5.4 Experimental set up
We set up scenarios as there were energy cuts of between 6 to
60 h. 100,000 households are affected in a big city. After 6 h,
initial recovery actions are done. After 60 h, the incident was
solved, no message needs to send. The process of sending
incident notification to residential consumers is a highly col-
laborative process. Each involved partner needs to provide
data collaboratively.
Normally all marketers and other participated organiza-
tions run their data individually based. The marketers could
decide to send their customers’ basic contact information to
the cloud owner OMEL for distributing all notifications about
incident recovery. The marketers could also send incident
notifications to their customs after the OMEL announcement
by themselves.
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Fig. 4 Computing power costs of two hypothetical workload scenarios
To run the experiment, we distinguish two Internet net-
work bandwidths: one is among involved enterprises; and
another is between marketers and the cloud. Depends on
where the residential customers’ data (i.e., at the marketers’
sides or, centralizing it at OMEL side) is, the speeds of send-
ing out notifications are thus different.
We select two hypothetical workload scenarios. The first
workload scenario represents an incident or maintenance
event that initially impacts a large amount of households.
After an initial buildup time, temporary resolutions are
quickly put in place such that many households are no longer
impacted such that further notifications are no longer required
for these households. The notification process is completed
after the incident has been fully resolved. An example of such
an incident could be a broken cable where neighborhoods and
other larger groupings of households are gradually rerouted
well before the broken cable is repaired.
The second workload scenario depicts an incident or main-
tenance event that escalates before slowly being resolved.
Initially few households are impacted, but this amount grows
significantly before the issues are eventually resolved grad-
ually. The incident is eventually resolved after some time.
5.4.1 Resource-level resilience analysis
There are many different resources which could be used
for running a system. The resources of the CIMNP sys-
tems include computing powers, process engines, human
resources.
One of the considerations in the design of these systems
is whether using elastic cloud resources is appropriate and
worthwhile. In Fig. 4, the dashed line represents the needed
computing power without auto-scaling virtual machines
(VRs) and the solid line denotes the computing power with
auto-scaling VRs involved in computing the power costs of
Table 2 Resilience factors of computing powers
Resilience factors ρ
No VRs Using VRs
Scenario 1 1 1.42753
Scenario 2 1 1.417
the two hypothetical workload scenarios as mentioned in
Sect. 5.4.
In this experiment, the scaling policies are set as: if the
average CPU load is below 40% for 5 min, the number of
virtual machine is reduced; if the average CPU load is above
70% for 5 min, one new virtual machine is added [18].
The examples of the resilience factors for the above-
mentioned computing power resilience (ρ) are presented in
Table 2, Scenario 1 refers the hypothetical workload scenario,
which an incident initially impacts a large amount of house-
holds. In this scenario, to process the large amount of requests
five VRs are used. Using one VR, there is 30% computing
power increase for the system. Therefore, ρ is [1, 1.42753].
Scenario 2 refers to the hypothetical workload scenario:
an incident/maintenance event that escalates before slowly
being resolved. In this scenario, three VRs are used; there-
fore, ρ is [1, 1.417].
The design of CIMNP deploys that multiple process
mashup engines run at different partners. This allows them
to function as backups for each other, i.e., at different situa-
tions. Resource-level resilience relates to elastic computing
powers, redundancy of process engines, data redundancy.
5.4.2 Service-level resilience analysis
Services are building blocks for the CIMNPs. Similar to pro-
cessing capacity, (web) services may not be available or over
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their capacity (possibly caused externally to the system).
Automatic service replacement or service invocation reallo-
cation mechanisms need to be designed at the system level. In
cloud environments many services may transparently scale
on the demand, or allow for the specification of an alternative
instance to invoke.
Service-level resilience could also be improved by pre-
design of service invocation reallocation mechanisms and
use of scalable services on demand. The consideration of
such mechanisms should be kept in mind at the design and
execution configuration stages.
5.4.3 Process incident-level resilience analysis
Process instance resilience relates to how process instances
can recover from failures. In this aspect, direct failures are
normally due to incorrect assumptions or pure logic errors
(bugs in the process model), and of less interest within the
resilience discussion.
From a temporal dimension perspective, process instances
are, due to their inherent nature as long-running, reasonably
resilient to non-permanent failures. The lower the pressure
on timing, the stronger the resilience.
From a detectability perspective, only signaled failures are
normally handled by process instances, and higher resilience
generally implies more complete failure management, that
includes the availability of sufficient semantic information
such as to allow automatic restarts or rerouting for failed
paths/components. Silent non-performance can possibly be
handled through monitoring and timeouts, but in many cases
cannot be distinguished from other forms of silent failure.
In terms of partial failure, degraded performance may lead
to timing issues on the process instance, but otherwise should
not impact the performance of the process. Reduced quality
of performance leads to reduced quality of the instance, and
reduced provision would lead to some instances failing (those
affected by the reduction) and some succeeding.
In relation to the location of failure, external failure is
normally failure of delegates/activities, but can also be a
failure in the execution environment (e.g., hardware failure).
External failure of the execution environment could be com-
pensated by regular replication solutions for the state of the
execution environment (e.g., database replication/sharing)
that is not specific to process management. In terms of direct
failure, there are two aspects to the resilience of process
models. First is the ability of humans to interject in process
instances and possibly modify them or provide “missing”
data; this is mainly a property of the management system and
the used process language. The other aspect is the frequency
of instances. In other words, while it may be technically fea-
sible to intervene in a process instance and recover it, it may
not be feasible for large amounts of instances that failed due
to fundamentally the same cause.
For CIMNPS, an incident and many maintenance notifi-
cation process instances could be running concurrently. For
example, this is the case in the first scenario we mentioned
in Sect. 5.4. When a number of maintenance notification
processes are running, an incident impacts a large amount
of households. The running process instances need to be
prioritized for overall reduction in the effect on system
performance. Such prioritization mechanisms should be
included at the design stage to improve the resilience of the
system.
5.4.4 Process model-level resilience analysis
The resilience of processes is strongly related to the resilience
of process instances. There are, however, ways in which the
execution system can make processes be resilient even when
individual instances fail. Conversely, timing and speed issues
that are not problematic at instance level, may become so at
process level.
Process resilience at a temporal level requires monitoring
and (pre-emptive) intervention and/or rerouting. Processes
are resilient when it is easy to (automatically) replace the
providers of services for the process (activity execution
or process management), but it requires a resilient system
to actually make use of those possibilities. Obviously if
these measures can be performed on already started process
instances, this would even be better.
At process level, the detectability of failures is limited
to the ability to express overall expectations, possibly at
aggregate level. These process-level specifications could then
allow for pre-emptive intervention in the instantiation of new
processes. Note that at process or system level it may also be
feasible to determine some degree of likelihood of the var-
ious forms of silent failure by aggregating monitoring data
and linking it to the expectations.
At process-level partial failure of some instances would
constitute partial failure of the process. A resilient process
would allow the instance failures to be minimized and possi-
bly corrected through re-execution along an alternative path.
To do the latter, does require sufficient information to be
available for the process components to be able to determine
the semantic validity of doing so.
Locus of failure at process level implies some degree of
process quality requirements as well as designs that min-
imize the impact of external failures. Again, monitoring
of individual service and instance performance can help in
detecting, mitigating and avoiding these failures or transition-
ing them from non-performance to degraded performance by
for example choosing a lower quality service that does not
have availability issues.
As mentioned in Sect. 4.2, selecting right process mod-
eling languages and process running environments is very
important for improving the process-level resilience. The
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process running environment is even more important, which
decides the resilience of the system.
5.4.5 System-level resilience analysis
Overall the entire systems resilience is a combination of the
resilience of the constituting processes. Many measures at
overall level can, however, help to achieve this resilience. In
particular the provision of fallback execution environments
or services will improve the overall resilience of the system.
Resilience in terms of fault tolerance mainly depends on the
resilience of the components (services, processes) and suf-
ficient provision of execution environments without single
point of failure.
The previous section discussed the resilience of the com-
ponents that make up CIMNPS system on a technical level
rather than at stakeholder level. Organizational factors may
limit options or have external impacts on system design and
resilience. The possibilities of collaborative process manage-
ment can, on a theoretical level be seen as a subset of what
single entity-controlled process management provides. On a
practical level, there are resilience benefits to collaborative
process execution (there are also disadvantages in complexity
and management). In addition, in real-world business sce-
narios it is often not desirable to have centralized process
control.
In terms of resilience, collaborative process manage-
ment means that by implication, processes are managed
by multiple independent execution environments. While
these environments may have access to different components
(such as company internal services) they would have similar
orchestration capabilities. As collaborative processes allow
parts of execution to be delegated to other execution environ-
ments this means that an overall master coordinator does not
require direct access to all required components for process
execution.
At system and process level, through a lack of single point
of failure and lack of a global coordination requirement,
cloud-based SOA collaboration solution provides a strong
level of resilience against total failure. Performance degra-
dation, especially non-functional degradation, can be com-
pensated for by additional provisioning elsewhere within the
collaboration. Even the absence of certain unique resources,
would only result in those processes being unavailable.
The services used by a system are independent of the
form of process management, and their resilience is mainly a
property that influences higher levels. Distributed collabora-
tion, however, brings some interesting perspectives to process
instance resilience.
Within hierarchical distributed collaboration it is possi-
ble that, beside the master execution environment multiple
delegate environments are active concurrently. Fallback, if
semantically valid within the process, would, however, still
be possible as long as a strict order of fallbacks is known
by all candidates. These candidates would also be required
to have some degree of overall knowledge of the process,
possibly under some sort of escrow approach.
6 Related work
The notion of resilience has been getting attention for many
different disciplines. Resilience is an emergent property asso-
ciated with an enterprise system’s capability to continue its
mission despite disruption through. We reviews resilience
related work from overall conceptual definition and frame-
work of resilience analysis from ICT systems, enterprise
information systems, business process management systems,
design principles of enterprise systems, to resilience analysis
and simulation model for SOA enterprise systems.
6.1 Design framework and principles of ICT systems
Di Marzo Serugendo et. al. [11] present a metadata-based
architectural model for dynamically resilient ICT systems,
which support different sources of data from communica-
tion providers such as GPS, sensors. The design considers
predictable dynamic resilience of open systems built from
components that interact via a network-based infrastructure.
The proposed architecture is thus emphasis on to deliver
dynamic resilience within bounds that can be predicted at
design time.
Papers [52] and [28] provide earlier work on design of
resilient enterprise information systems. Different resilience
concepts from different disciplines are reviewed. Different
capabilities or concepts related to resilience are distin-
guished. A guideline for further developing and implement-
ing practical enterprise systems to be more resilient are
discussed in [52]. Paper [28] further presents seven archi-
tectural constraints for resilience. The seven constraints are
elicited from good architectural practices for developing
reliable and fault-tolerant systems and the state-of-the-art
technologies in distributed computing. Again, the provided
design principle of enterprise systems is in an abstract level
for guideline proposes.
Paper [14] proposes a framework to create enterprise
resilience using service-oriented architecture approach. The
proposed framework provides an abstract theoretical model,
which explains how SOA can help in creating enterprise
resilience. No quantitative analysis of resilience of SOA sys-
tems is provided.
Müller et al. highlight importance of resilience for busi-
ness organizations [32]. The paper explicitly addresses the
different capabilities of an organization being resilience and
explains how to incorporated resilience into existing business
information system design in an abstract level.
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Antunes and Mourão consider a framework and related
services for building business process management (BPM)
to be more resilient [4]. This work is more specific for
designing business process management systems which is
one kind of enterprise systems. The paper looks the resilience
related supports in the current business process management
systems, i.e., failure handling, exception handling, model
adaptation, restricted ad hoc changes, and unstructured inter-
ventions. Furthermore, a set of services integrating resilience
support in BPM system are discussed,
6.2 Resilience analysis and simulationmode
Jassbi et.al proposes a framework for evaluating resilience
of disaster rescue networks [19]. The work aims to provide
an evaluation mode through employing experts’ knowledge,
for measuring a resilience index in disaster rescue networks.
A quantitative mode is presented to keep a record of res-
cue networks and how they are achieving adequate levels of
resilience, which provides a resilience simulation model.
This research is based on our previous papers [10] and [9]
from PROVE 215 and PROVE 216, respectively. Paper [10]
presents an approach to analyze resilience of a SOA collab-
orative process system in cloud-environment. The resilience
of the solution is related to a service-level agreement (SLA)
of the maximum time to process certain services against
the actual time to process certain services. The method is
adapted from the work of Marcon et al. [29], which provides
resilience to the re-evaluation of usage policies of individual
users. The resilience is providing the model with the abil-
ity to deal with some individual user authorization attributes
exceeding, which the SLA for the respective consumption
service is under the contracted amount. Our another previous
work [9] reviews federated collaborative process manage-
ment and analyses the resilience of federated collaborative
process management in the new context.
Francis and Bekera propose a resilience analysis frame-
work and a metric for measuring resilience [15]. The
framework is focused on the achievement of resilience capac-
ities for engineered and infrastructure systems (e.g., electric
power networks). Their resilience framework consisting of
attributes such as adaptive capacity, absorptive capacity, and
recoverability enables analysis of system performance for
highly uncertain or unforeseeable environment. Based on
their work of resilience factor, we extend to the SOA collab-
orative business process system. Different resilience factors
are defined based on different perspectives of the system lay-
ers. Such SOA collaborative business process systems could
be designed as BPaaS solutions with elastic services power
and deployed in cloud-base environments. Our work pre-
sented in this paper addresses these new trends for analyzing
the resilience of SOA collaborative business process systems.
7 Conclusions
From the discussion above, it is clear that beyond meet-
ing business needs in providing the benefits of collaboration
while safeguarding independence of control, collaborative
process environments also bring interesting resilience prop-
erties. Improving the resilience of SOA-based collaborative
systems is quite feasible when it is easy to (automatically)
replace the providers of services for the process (activity exe-
cution or process management), but it requires a resilient
system to actually make use of those possibilities.
The fundamental challenges of providing an appropriate
definition of resilience of SOA collaborative process manage-
ment system, analyzing, measuring, and further improving
the resilience of these systems have motivated our research.
We thus look at the different perspectives of the SOA col-
laborative process management systems, respectively. From
the resource- and service-level perspectives, elastic comput-
ing provision and services with automatic replacements are
certainly able to handle unpredicted workloads. At process
model level, parallelism contained at design time includes
the more flexible order of execution of activities. This means
that the selection of process modeling languages and exe-
cution environments at design time is important. Process
modeling languages supporting deferred choices could leave
the resolution of a choice to the process engine at runtime,
which provides flexibility for individual process instances.
At the system level, the running process instances need to
be prioritized for overall reduction in the effect on system
performance. Such prioritization mechanisms need to be
included in the design to improve the resilience of the sys-
tem. Continually monitoring and proactive model process
executions and collecting unspecified factors and analyzing
their impacts to the system feedback to the refine the system
and improve the case handle mechanism at runtime, which
is essential for improving system resilience.
The resilience analysis of CIMNPS has demonstrated
how to determine resilience factors of different perspectives
within CIMNPS. The resilience factor at the resource level of
CIMNPS is analyzed. The potential resilience improvements
have been discussed at service level, process instance level,
process model level, and system level, respectively. Further-
more, we look at related work around resilience analysis of
ICT systems.
There are some limitations to our current research.
Service-level and process incident-level resilience analyses,
needed for analyzing the resilience of CIMNPS, are not
included in this paper. More running data need to be col-
lected for the analysis. The further analysis of the overall
system level is needed to identify failure events, performance
degradation, etc., which will allow us to analyze the expected
system functionality degradation (ξ ).
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